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The Yale Law Journal feels keenly the loss to itself and to the
Yale Law School in the departure of Dean Robert M. Hutchins,
whose resignation from the school to accept the presidency of
Chicago University has recently been announced. Dean Hutchins
brought to his post a brilliant mind and a forceful personality.
Within the three years of his incumbency, he has gained the re-
spect and admiration of the students and has won the confidence
and cooperation of his colleagues on the faculty. New paths in
legal education have been blazed within this period, and the em-
phasis of Dean Hutchins on the relation of law to the social
sciences has been a distinct contribution. The school has been
fortunate in having received Dean Hutchins' animating touch
during this period of his remarkable career.
For Dean-elect Charles E. Clark the Journal already feels an
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affectionate regard. It has enjoyed for many years his sym-
pathetic counsel and active devotion to its interests. His breadth
and depth of scholarship and personality have gained for him
national recognition as a brilliant legal writer and teacher. The
Yale Law School may well look forward with confidence to his
administration of its fortunes.
THE VALUATION OF NATURAL GAS LEASEHOLDS
After thirty years of agitation it is to be expected that the
problem of valuation in public utility rate cases should have lost
the novelty that invites fresh analysis. The apparent similarity
of the litigated questions has encouraged courts to rely strongly
upon precedent, and the periodic reiteration of well phrased
dicta has tended to create an abstract issue upon which each new
case has been made to turn. Under such circumstances a re-
analysis of the problem could receive impetus only when the
courts were called upon to apply their doctrines to .an unique
situation in relation to which precedent was not even plausible.
It is for this reason that the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Ky.1
may be considered significant. In that case the Court was asked
to determine the proper value to be ascribed to natural gas lease-
holds, a question in public utility valuation which had not pre-
viously come before the Court.
The case was an appeal from the decree of a federal district
court denying an injunction sought by the company to restrain
the Railroad Commission of Kentucky from enforcing a schedule
of rates at which natural gas was to be distributed in cities of
that state. The district court had sustained the commission's
valuation of the company's leaseholds at book cost.2 The com-
pany contended for an appreciated value based upon an estima-
tion of profits to be derived from future sales of gas contained
in the land covered by the leases.3 These calculations were sup-
1278 U. S. 300, 49 Sup. Ct. 150 (1929). United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm. of W. Va., 278 U. S. 322, 49 Sup. Ct. 157 (1929) is a com-
panion case. Questions concerning the company's franchises treated in
the Kentucky 'case are excluded from the present discussion. For the
lower courts' opinions see United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Ky.,
13 F. (2d) 510 (E. D. Ky. 1925); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm. of W. Va., 14 F. (2d) 209 (S. D. W. Va. 1926).
2 The lower court in the Kentucky case took the book cost of the lease-
holds, $6,343,329. (This was something in excess of actual cost.) The
lower court in the West Virginia case made no finding as to the total
value of the company's gas rights, but, accepting the company's own com-
putations, excluded a major part of the gas field as not "presently used
or useful in public service," and reached an assumed valuation of
$10,317,311.
3 The company's gas field included 814,910 acres, located principally in
West Virginia. The company owned 41,969 acres in fee. The remainder
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plemented by the testimony of practical gas operators concerning
the present exchange value of the leaseholds. The result in each
case was an amount five times as great as that accepted by the
commission.
The unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, in an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Stone, affirmed the decree of the lower
court on the ground that "the -value of property used in a busi-
ness whose rates are regulated is made to depend on an assumed
earning capacity and the data relied on to establish assumed
earning capacity are essentially speculative-so much so as to
form no trustworthy basis for computation of value." 4
A consideration of this decision should at the outset concern
the relation of the case to the specific problem of regulating
natural gas rates. The natural gas industry is in many respects
unique. It is subject to obvious geographical limitations, and
its activities must necessarily be terminated in a given area when
the supply of gas there is exhausted.5 But there can be no doubt
that a company distributing gas indiscriminately among domestic
and industrial consumers is engaged in public service and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the commission of the state within
which it operates.0  The state's control over the industry may,
however, be restricted where interstate commerce is affected.T
But this conflict arises chiefly where the gas is produced by one
was controlled by lease or contract under which the lessee had the right to
drill for gas for ten years, with the privilege of renewal, at a small annual
rental, materially increased by royalties to the lessor when production was
established. In computing value, the company's experts excluded 552,V18
acres as of too uncertain content. The remainder was divided into proven
territory, 136,384 acres, with an estimated content of 249,100,000,000 cubic
feet of gas; and probable territory, 126,208 acres, with an estimated content
of 414,600,000,000 cubic feet. The method of computing the content in
the proven area, which was in actual operation, was to find the existing
rock pressure of the gas in various pools, and to compare the rate of
decrease in rock pressure with the amount of gas produced during the
same period. Estimates in the probable acreage were by analogy to the
nearest pool in operation.
It was found that natural gas could be sold for industrial purposes in
an unregulated market in Pittsburg at 35 cents for 1000 cubic feet, and
that on an estimated annual production, that market could absorb the
company's gas supply in eighteen years. The cost of getting the gas to
Pittsburg was calculated and the resultant profit was discounted to give an
alleged "present value" of $32,458,129 to the company's gas holdingo.
4 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Ky., supra note 1, at 317,
49 Sup. Ct. at 155.
S See Graves v. Iroquois Nat. Gas Co., P. U. R. 1920F 563, 568 (N. Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm. 2d Dist.).
6 Clarksburg Light and Heat Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 84 W. Va. 639,
100 S. E. 551 (1919); Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Norton Co., 165 Arl:-
172, 263 S. W. 775 (1924); People's Natural Gas Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm., 270 U. S. 550, 46 Sup. Ct. 371 (1926).
7A state may not require a distributing company also producing gas
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company outside the state and sold to a distributor within the
state.8
Once the state commission has established its jurisdiction,
more difficult problems arise. Rules for the supervision of rates
in other types of public service are inadequate. It is necessary
to adapt the regulatory machinery to the unique technology of
natural gas production. The matter of depreciation, for instance,
presents the perplexing question of a policy of amortization to
be included in the operating expenses to offset the peculiar kind
of depletion that attaches to property devoted to production in
rapidly exhaustible areas.9
A still more baffling problem has been to allocate to natural
gas leaseholds a reasonable value for purposes of the rate base.
The solution of this problem involves two considerations: (a) the
proportion of a company's total reserves that may properly be
deemed "presently used or useful" in public service; 10 (b) the
measure of value for that portion that is in use.
within the state to subordinate its interstate business to the demands of
local consumers. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 Sup.
Ct. 658 (1923). Nor may a state prohibit the construction of pipe lines
for the transmission of gas in interstate commerce. Oklahoma v. Kansas
Natural Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229, 31 Sup. Ct. 564 (1911). But, on the other
hand, a company directly distributing gas to consumers in one state may
not escape regulation by that state simply because it produces its gas in
another state and transmits the fuel in pipe lines across the border. Penn-
sylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm. of N. Y., 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup.
Ct. 279 (1920).
8 Thus, the state in which the distributing company operates may not
regulate the price at which the producing company engaged in interstate
commerce sells its product. Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 282 Fed.
341 (W. D. Mo. 1922); Re Crystal City Gas Co., P. U. It. 1923B 828
(N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm.); cf. Re Gallatin Natural Gas Co., P. U. R.
1926A 145 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm.). However, the producing company
may not object to the state's regulation of the distributing company's
charges to the consumer on the ground that interstate commerce is thereby
burdened. Public Util. Comm. v. Landon, 249 U. S. 236, 39 Sup. Ct.
268 (1919). The problem here is to be compared with that relating to the
interstate transmission of electrical energy. Public Util. Comm. of R. 1.
v. Attleboro Co., 273 U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (1927).
9 See Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm., 90 Okla. 84,
216 Pac. 917 (1923); Charleston v. Public Serv. Comm., 95 W. Va. 91, 120
S. E. 398 (1923); Re Ashtabula Gas Co., P. U. R. 1917'D 790 (Ohio Pub.
Util. Comm.); Re United Fuel Gas Co., P. U. R. 1924A 357 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm.). See also lower court decisions in the instant cases, supra
note 1. For a discussion of the general question of depreciation, see Com-
ment (1926) 36 YALE L. J. 123.
10 The policy of the commissions on this point seems not yet to have
fully crystallized. The West Virginia commission asserts the right to limit
the amount of reserves necessary for the public service. Re United Fuel
Gas Co., P. U. R. 1918C 193 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm.). The lower court
in the instant West Virginia case dealt with the problem and excluded
all but the actually proven acreage. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Serv.
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This latter phase of the problem is one which has necessarily
required close analysis. The issue has been that which con-
fronted the Supreme Court in the instant case, namely, whether
uncertain evidence as to appreciation will be accepted, or whether
the value is to be fixed at an amount ascertainable from the
company's own record of expenditures, and, therefore, approxi-
mating actual cost. The question has been considered most
frequently in those cases where a single company is both pro-
ducer and distributor of the gas. Where one company purchases
its gas from another, the question arises only if the commission
seeks to regulate the price at which the gas is sold to the dis-
tributor. This is impossible where the producing company is
transmitting the gas from another state, unless the doctrine of
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Pitblic Serice Comm. of NV. Y. is to be
extended." But if the producing company is within the juris-
diction of the state commission it would seem that its relations
with the distributing company, including the price set on its gas,
may be subjected to official scrutiny. 2  Yet even here commis-
sions often permit the distributing company to include the cost
of the gas in its operating expenses at whatever price must be
paid.'13 In such cases the commissions, perhaps unwittingly,
require the consumer to pay a return on the full market value
of the producing company's leaseholds.
But where both the producing and distributing agencies are
before the commission in one case, the problem of evaluating the
leaseholds can be neither overlooked nor consciously avoided.
And under these circumstances the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania has refused to ascribe anything less than "present market
Comm. of W. Va., supra note 1, at 221. Mr. Justice Stone, although
affirming the lower court in that case, assumes in his opinion on the Ken-
tucky case "that both proven and probable areas of appellants gas acreage
whether shown to be presently productive or not, if required in a prudent
administration of appellant's business, are to be included in the valuation
for rate making purposes." United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of
Ky., supra note 1, at 313, 49 Sup. Ct. at 153. Similar questions arise
concerning a distribution of reserves between the regulated and the unregu-
lated phases of the company's business, and an allocation of proportions
of the total holdings to business done in each of several states.
" Svpra notes 7 and 8. See also Joplin Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm.,
296 Fed. 271 (W. D. Mo. 1924). In St. Joseph Gas Co. v. Barher, 243 Fed.
206 (W. D. Mo. 1916) the court refused to grant the distributing company
an increase in charges to consumers because it feared such an increase
would be immediately absorbed by the producing company over which it
had no control.
Board of Education v. Guthrie Gas Light Co., P. U. R. 1915B 177
(Okla. Corp. Comm.); Re Kokomo Gas and Fuel Co., P. U. R. 1921E 390
(Ind. Pub. Serv. Comm.); Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Corporation Cbmm., 95
Okla. 213, 220 Pac. 28 (1923).
"3 Re Southern Counties Gas Co., P. U. R. 1921E 374 (Cal. R. R. Comm.);
Re Elmira Water, Light and Railroad Co., P. U. R. 1922D 231 (N. Y.
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value" to the company's holdings." This view has also been ex-
pressed in a few other cases.15 Illustrating as they do the pitfalls
that surround the present value concept, these cases have been
sporadic impressions rather than the experienced reflections of
administrative bodies that have grappled continuously over a
long period of years with the task of regulating the natural gas
industry. The West Virginia Public Service Commission is prob-
ably the most experienced body in the United States in this
particular field. It is significant to trace the development of
its policy.
In 1917 the commission was disposed to grant some apprecia-
tion in the value of leaseholds.r Yet, later in the same year it
reduced, without explanation, an excessive amount allocated to
leases in a proposed rate base. 17 In 1918 the commission came
forward with the statement that since the consumers paid as
operating expenses the delay rentals which maintained the leases,
they should share in the eventual appreciation.8 Two years
Pub. Serv. Comm.) (in that case, however, the producing company may
have been protected by the commerce clause); Coffeyville Gas and Fuel
Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 116 Kan. 165, 225 Pac. 1036 (1924); Western
Okla. Gas and Fuel Co. v. State, 113 Okla. 126, 239 Pac. 588 (1925); Re
Kansas City Gas Co., P. U. R. 1925A 653 (Mo. Pub. Serv. Comm.),
14 Erie v. Public Serv. Comm., 278 Pa. 512, 123 Atl. 471 (1924).
15 Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 211 App. Div. 253, 207
N. Y. Supp. 599 (3d Dep't 1925). Compare also: "We cannot close our
eyes to the fact that these leases in Montana have today a more or less
definite market or exchange value not necessarily related to their potential
wealth-producing ability under fair rates. What they will or may produce
and earn is recognized as too remote to warrant a guess at proper capitaliza-
tion, but as 'potentials' they have a present value, and whatever that
value is, their owners may capitalize and if the owners are engaged in a
public service and raw acreage is held for that service, it is a proper
capital charge therein." Re Baker Natural Gas Utility, P. U. R. 1921E
609, 622 (Mont. Pub. Serv. Comm.). The Kansas Public Service Commis-
sion has made the naive suggestion that where earnings scarcely exceed
the expense of production it is impossible to give the holdings "present
value." Landon v. Lawrence, P. U. R. 1916B 331 (Kan. Pub. Serv. Comm.).
16 "While it may be difficult to arrive at a fair value of applicant's
property and the conclusions reached may not be much better than a mere
guess or conjecture, we do not adhere to the proposition that the company
must be limited to its actual investment. If one has been fortunate in
leasing or purchasing undeveloped or partially developed territory at a
remarkably low figure and by subsequent energy and labor developed said
territory, thereby making a 'sure thing' out of a probability and materially
enhancing the value thereof, he is certainly entitled to that increased value,
even though, as suggested, it may be difficult to ascertain definitely what
that value is." Re Clarksburg Light and Heat Co., P. U. R. 1917A 577,
592 (W. Va. Pub. Serv. Comm.).
27Re Montgomery Gas Co., P. U. R. 1917C 924 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm.).




later the United Fuel Gas Company's proposed valuation was
rejected as being predicated upon earnings; and the commission,
in view of uncertainty and speculation in the other methods
suggested, limited its valuation of the leases in question to the
actual cost.19 This view has been consistently followed in cases
decided by the commission since that time.20 It was suggested
in 1924 that all complexities of the issue might be avoided by
disregarding leaseholds in the rate base and valuing the gas as
a commodity at the city gates.21 But this view has not been
widely considered, and it would seem rather to gloss over the
difficulties than to solve them.
The reports clearly indicate, therefore, that the West Virginia
Commission, although at first subscribing to a vague measure of
present value, has as a matter of practical administration been
forced to turn to actual cost in evaluating leaseholds. This
change of policy has received the approbation of the state
supreme court 22 and is also supported in other jurisdictions 3
But the attitude of the West Virginia Commission does not rest
solely on the speculative character of a measure of value other
than actual cost. Its policy rests equally, as is expressed in one
of its most recent opinions, upon a consideration of the con-
sumer's share in any accruing appreciation, through his assump-
tion of the burden of delay rentals.24 And, consistently with this
proposition, the commission would exclude even the sum of the
delay rentals from the cost of the lease to the company. -
The instant case may be considered an authoritative ratifica-
19 Re United Fuel Gas Co., P. U. R. 1920C 5S3 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm.).2 0 Re Hope Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1921E 418 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm.); Re Hope Natural Gas Co., P. U. R. 1922C 336 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm.); Re United Fuel Gas Co., P. U. R. 1925B 705 (W. Va. Pub. Serv.
Comm.); Re Cumberland and Alleghany Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928B 20 (W.
Va. Pub. Serv. Comm.).
21Re United Fuel Gas Co., supra note 9; cf. Re American Indian Oil
and Gas Co., P. U. R. 1928C 815 (Okla. Corp. Comm.); Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. State, 78 Okla. 5, 188 Pac. 338 (1920) ; Re Osage and Oklahoma
Co., P. U. R. 1917D 426 (Okla. Corp. Comm.).
22 Charleston v. Public Serv. Comm., 95 W. Va. 91, 120 S. E. 398 (1923).
The opinion contains dicta in support of actual investment as a theory of
valuation, but the court defers to what it believes to be the United States
Supreme Court's theory of present value, and sustains the commission
merely because there is no competent evidence of appreciation. Cf. Natural
Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm., 95 W. Va. 557, 121 S. E. 716 (1924).
23 Re Northeastern Oil and Gas Co., P. U. R. 1916D 692 (Ohio Pub.
Util. Comm.); Re Iroquois Natural Gas Co., P. U. B. 1919D 76 (N. Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm.); Re American Indian Oil and Gas Co., P. U. R. 1924E 114
(Okla. Corp. Comm.).
24Re West Virginia Central Gas Co., P. U. R. 1924E 24 (W. Va. Pub.
Serv. Comm.). See also Re West Va. Cent. Gas Co., supra note 18.




tion of commission procedure, insofar as it excludes speculative
methods of valuation. Mr. Justice Stone is particularly adroit
in recognizing (a) that no market can be expected to remain
unregulated for eighteen years, (b) that in predicating present
value upon future earnings it is impossible to anticipate the
extent to which advances in technology will reduce future costs
of production, (c) that no valid ground exists for assuming that
natural gas may not in the future be entirely supplanted by a
more economical substitute. But the opinion ignores the pos-
sibility that, even if an enhanced value could be satisfactorily
shown, the consumer might be entitled to share in the fruits of
appreciation. Nor can the opinion be considered an unqualified
approval of the actual cost measure, since Mr. Justice Stone at
the outset expressly assumes ". . . that in the case as presented,
present reproduction value of property used and useful in the
business, if ascertainable, is to be taken as the rate base." 20 But
this assumption is carefully qualified to avoid being mistaken
for a statement of general policy. It is to be noted, however,
that affirmance in this case is in fact a ratification of a value
closely approximating actual cost.
Since the case on appeal was but a critical examination of the
company's evidence, the Court was not compelled to allude to
precedent. That policy' undoubtedly obviated confusion and
assisted a clear analysis. This might not have been possible
had the Court become enmeshed in the tangle of its past incon-
sistencies. For although the Minnesota Rate Cases recognized
the necessity for avoiding a "speculative increment of value," 27
the Court was not there deterred from adopting the "fair market
value of adjoining land" as a measure of value for railroad
rights of way. And, while the Court in one case has frowned
upon an inflated value of a franchise as too insecurely estab-
lished, 2 it has in another case confidently stood for a capitaliza-
tion of estimated reduction in future costs of production to be
ascribed to new inventions in the manufacture of gas.20 The
Knoxville Water Company case assumed the certainty of repro-
duction cost.30 The Southwestern Bell Telephone case insisted
upon "an honest and intelligent forecast of probable future value,
made upon a view of all relevant circumstances." 31 The Court
20 United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm. of Ky., supra note 1, at 313,
49 Sup. Ct. at 153.
27 Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 452, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 762 (1913).
28 Wilcox v. Consolidation Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 192 (1909).
29 Pacific Gas Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S. 403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537 (1924).
30 City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 29 Sup. Ct. 148
(1909).




in the McCardle case - was undisturbed by the possible elements
of conjecture in a calculation of value based upon expected trends
in future price levels.
It is possible, therefore, that the decision in this case repre-
sents a new attitude, and that the Court, which thirty years ago
blandly announced the "proper" measures of value, has now
developed an awareness of the problem which makes it anxious
to avoid the creation of additional generalities which might
become embarrassing in the disposition of future cases.
R. J. S.
ALLOCATION OF THE INCOME TAX AFTER ASSIGNMENT OF THE
RIGHT TO THE INCOME
An important problem in income taxation which has arisen a
number of times within the past few years is illustrated by the
case of J. V. Leydig I which was recently before the Board of
Tax Appeals. The facts of this ease were briefly these. The
petitioner leased land to an oil development company which
agreed to sink wells and to give him, as compensation, a portion
of the total oil produced. Thereafter, the petitioner, in consid-
eration of love and affection, conveyed to his wife, by a written
assignment, a one-half interest in all royalties subsequently to
accrue under his contract with the development company. The
petitioner and his wife filed separate income tax returns, divid-
ing the royalty interests equally between themY The commis-
sioner recomputed the petitioner's income on the theory that,
despite the assignment, the entire sum realized on the royalties
constituted income to the assignor. On appeal to the board, the
commissioner's ruling was reversed.
Although a number of cases representing various phases of
this problem have recently been before the board, the incon-
sistency of their decisions has tended only to confuse the subject.
This inconsistency may be ascribed, in large measure, to a failure
to analyze and to distinguish between the different types of
cases as well as to the absence of any accepted test by which
to determine when the assignor should be taxed and when the
-" McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. CL 144
(1926).
115 B. T. A. 124 (1929); cf. Marshall Field, 15 B. T. A. 718 (1929);
T. J. Rogers, 15 B. T. A. 638 (1929); Wallace Huntington, 15 B. T. A.
851 (1929).
2 The effect of this would be, in most cases, to reduce substantially the
total family income tax. Under our revenue laws, both the normal tax and
the surtax rates are progressive, thereby imposing a proportionately heavier
burden on larger incomes. 43 STAT. 264, 265 (1924), 2G U. S. C. §§ 951,




assignee. An attempt to state some such test has already been
made. In the case of Arthur H. Van Brunt,8 the Board of Tax
Appeals has laid down as a general rule that the assignor can
avoid the payment of income tax only by an assignment of the
"corpus" from which this income is derived and not by merely
assigning the income. The Leydig case, while purporting to
follow this rule, substituted for the term "corpus" the much
broader term "property right," 4 which is comprehensive enough
to include not only tangible property but contract rights as well.
The effect of the board's decision is practically to overthrow the
rule of the Van Brunt case.5 This test, moreover, has not been
applied by the federal courts.8 It appears to rest on no very
secure foundation.j An attempt will here be made to work out
a more satisfactory basis of decision from an analysis of the
different types of cases.
1. The "assignee" is given only a personal claim against the
"assignor." This type of case is illustrated by Bing v. Bowers.8
The taxpayer executed to his mother a so-called assignment of
a certain sum out of his income. He was to collect the income
himself, however, and the instrument gave her only a personal
claim against her "assignor." Clearly this did not constitute a
3 11 B. T. A. 406 (1928).
4 See the language of the Board supra note 1, at 132: "We conceive the
rule to be that income per se cannot be assigned to relieve the assignor of
the tax levy, but, where the thing assigned was a property right, real or
personal, productive of income, income thereafter arising from such prop-
erty is income to the assignee by virtue of his ownership."
5 It must be noted that all contract rights are property. Under the rule
as stated, therefore, the absolute assignment of a right to receive income
would always render that income taxable against the assignee. Thus, the
owner of an apartment house, by making an assignment of the right to
receive rents, would transfer with that right the duty to pay the taxes on
that sum. This is radically different from the rule of the Van Brunt case,
under which that duty could be transferred only by making a gift of the
house. Although the language is somewhat vague, the test applied in the
Leydig case is essentially the one recommended herein.
6 O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, 24 F. (2d) 436 (D. Conn. 1928); Young v.
Gnitchel, 28 F. (2d) 789 (D. N. J.'1928) (assignment by the petitioner to
her husband, without consideration, of an annual sum from the income of
a trust fund, but no interest in the fund itself; this sum held not taxable as
the petitioner's income).
7 An irrevocable assignment of a right to receive income reduces the as-
signor's property rights quite as effectively as an assignment of the so-
called "corpus." Thereafter the assignee is the sole owner of this valuable
property right and can do with it what he wishes. It has escaped com-
pletely from the control of the assignor. Compare the remarks of Thomas,
J., in O'Malley-Keyes v. Eaton, supra note 6, at 437: "After all, the stark
fact is that the plaintiff did not receive this income and cannot receive this
income. To say that he did receive it is to indulge in a deliberate fiction."




real assignment 0 but amounted to no more than a promise to
pay over a portion of the income after it should be received. In
such cases the entire income has uniformly been held to be tax-
able to the "assignor," 10 whether or not the promise is enforce-
able 11 and even though he has received a consideration 2 It is
submitted that these decisions are sound. The taxpayer has in
fact received the entire sum as income. If consideration was
given for his promise to "assign" a portion of it, the promise
made was enforceable, but the tax-payer thereby secured the
benefit of the income. What he has really done is to spend it
before receiving it. If no consideration is paid, the "assign-
ment" amounts to no more than a promise to make a gift in the
future, which promise, unless under seal, is unenforceable. If
a gift is subsequently made in accordance with the promise it
is difficult to conceive of any reason why the donor should not
be taxed, in view of the fact that non-charitable gifts are not
deductible expenditures.13
2. The assignee receives a right to collect the incorne from
third persans coupled with ownership of the land or capital which
produces the income. The case of Willianz. W. Parshal 24 is a
good example. The petitioner made a gift to his wife of his
interest in a partnership, and thereafter the profits were paid
to her directly. This is the opposite extreme from the cases
just considered. The assignor has not only parted with his
right to receive the income but with the very capital which
produces the income. Probably no court would burden him with
the tax.'5  This is the only type of case in which he would escape
under the rule of the Van Brunt case.
3. The assignee receives a right to collect the incomne directly
from third persons but no interest in the land or capital which
produces the income. (a) For a valuable consideration. If A
has assigned to B for a valuable consideration his right to collect
9 An assignment carries with it the notion of a transfer. One can
transfer the ownership of a chattel or can transfer rights against a third
party by means of an assignment. One may create rights against himself
by means of a promise. To call such a promise an assignment is clearly
incorrect.
10 Bing v. Bowers, supra note 8; Charles F. Colbert, 12 B. T. A. 505
(1928) ; S. M. 2763, HI-2 Cum. Bull. 53 (1924); cf. I. T. 1846, 11-2 Cum.
Bull. 210 (1923).
11 See Bing v. Bowers, supra note 8, at 454.
12Mitchell v. Bowers, 9 F. (2d) 414 (S. D. N. Y. 1925), aff'd, 15 F. (2d)
287 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926); Yale Kneeland, 1 B. T. A. 150 (1924); Ormsby
McKnight Mitchell, 1 B. T. A. 143 (1924).
1343 STAT. 269 (1924), 44 STAT. 26 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 955 (1926).
147 B. T. A. 318 (1927).
1s This situation is so clear that it has seldom been litigated. In addition




from C an unmatured obligation owing from C to A, we must say
that this sum should be taxed against A if we are going to follow
the rule of the Van Brunt case to its logical conclusion. It is
here that the test breaks down utterly. Clearly A should not
be taxed merely because there has been no assignment of "the
corpus." As a matter of fact it is B who has received the benefit
of the income.16 The assignment, being for a consideration, is
irrevocable and A no longer has any rights with regard to the
assigned claim. Clearly A should be taxed only on the consid-
eration received from B which is his only real income.
One class of cases seems at first glance to be in conflict with
the test of irrevocability, i.e., where B is a creditor of A and the
assignment of the claim against C is in payment of A's debt. 1
Applying the same rule as above, A should be taxed only on the
consideration received from B. Since that consideration, how-
ever, is the payment of a debt or the discharge of a duty and
may be of uncertain value it may be more expedient to tax A
on the amount paid to B. It is not unfair to assess the value of
the consideration which he received at what he himself recog-
nized as the equivalent of it. As he has really received the
benefit of C's payment, there may be some justification for say-
ing that he has "constructively" received it."8
(b) Without consideration. Where the assignment has been
16 See the remarks of Thomas, J., supra note 7. It should be noted that
the right to receive future income is "property" but is not in itself income.
If income is assigned, the assignor has had the use of it and should be
taxed. We are speaking here of the assignment of an incorporeal right,
which right is not itself income but is productive of income.
17 1. T. 1846, supra note 10. Cf. Arthur H. Van Brunt, supra note 3
(assignment by taxpayer to his wife in consideration of her agreement
to pay household expenses; the taxpayer held responsible for the tax on
the income received by his wife under the assignment). The decision ap-
pears sound. It is only the test laid down that is objectionable. On
identical facts the same result was reached in A. R. R. 2245, 1I-1 Cum.
Bull. 61 (1923).
Where a corporation has leased all its property to another concern, the
lessee agreeing to'pay a nominal sum to the lessor and the balance to the
shareholders of the lessor as dividends, we have another, and perhaps
slightly analogous, exception to the general test of irrevocability. The
courts have generally held that the lessor must pay the tax. Blalock v.
Georgia Ry. & Electric Co., 246 Fed. 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1917)-; Rensselaer
& S. R. R. v. Irwin, 249 Fed. 726 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918), cert. denied, 246 U. S.
671, 38 Sup. Ct. 424 (1918). Since dividends received are not computed in
the "normal" tax of shareholders this is apparently the only way in which
the tax could be collected and accordingly, these decisions are probably
justified. 45 STAT. 802 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 2025 (1928).
Is The doctrine of constructive receipt has done much to confuse this
problem by obscuring the issue. See, for example, KLEIN, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATioN (1929) 124. After making the viry sensible statement that "the
person who can legally demand the payment of the income is the person to
be taxed" he wanders off into the maze of constructive receipt. "Usually,
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merely gratuitous, the problem is somewhat more complex.
Applying the same test as above, we must decide that if the
assignment is irrevocable, 9 the assignee should be taxed-not
the assignor. On the question of when a gratuitous assignment
is irrevocable, there is a conflict of authority. 0 If it is under
seal, it is clearly irrevocable.21 Where seals no longer have their
common-law effect, it is exceedingly doubtful just what is neces-
sary to make an irrevocable assignment, but it is very probable
that any writing which clearly expresses an intention to make
a present transfer of the right would be held to have that effect.
In the tax cases here involved the courts have so held without
discussion and have refused to tax the assignor.:2
of course, the person who owns the property .. . owns the income. ...
This is true even though he makes a gift of this income, before it arises,
to some third person. When received by such third person, it is construc-
tively received by the donor." Clearly the last sentence only tends to con-
fuse matters. If there is ever any utility in using the fiction of constructive
receipt (which is extremely doubtful) it should be limited strictly to cases
where the taxpayer assigns his claim in payment of an antecedent debt.
19 See KLEIN, ibid. The statement that the owner of the property "owns"
the income even though he has made a gift of it before the income arises is
clearly incorrect. Before it arises he could make no gift of the income but
only of the right to collect it. Since a valid gift is irrevocable the donce
alone has the right of collection. It is impossible to reconcile this state-
ment of the author with the one following which says that where the orig-
inal owner has divested himself of the legal right to demand the future
income, collection by the assignee is not deemed constructive receipt by the
original owner. The author is here speaking of a transfer for a legal con-
sideration, apparently disregarding the possibility of an irrevocable assign-
ment without consideration.
2o CONTRACTS RESTATEAENT (Am. L. Inst. 1928) § 158 (1) says that such
an assignment is revocable unless:
"(a) the assignment is in writing either under seal or of such a nature
as to be capable of transferring title to a chattel without delivery thereof
and without consideration; or
(b) the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible token or writing, the
surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract for its enforce-
ment, and this token or writing is delivered to the assignee; or
(c) the assignor should reasonably expect the assignment to produce ac-
tion or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of
the assignee, and such action or forbearance is induced."
See also the note to this section for a collection of cases. Ibid. 268.
21 Chase Nat. Bank v. Sayles, 11 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926), rcv'g
6 F. (2d) 403 (D. R..I. 1925), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 708, 47 Sup. Ct. 99
(1926).22 0'Mlalley-Keyes v. Eaton; Young v. Gnitchel, both supra note 6. The
Board of Tax Appeals apparently has not considered the question of revo-
cability to be involved. They have, however, generally taxed the assignor.
Alexander S. Brown, 3 B. T. A. 826 (1926); Fred W. Warner, 5 B. T. A.
963 (1926); Julius Rosenwald, 12 B. T. A. 350 (1928); cf. S. M. 2763,
supra note 10. Recent decisions of the Board, however, are in accord
with the Young ease. J. V. Leydig, supra note 1'; Edith H. Blaney, 13
B. T. A. 1315 (1928); William I. Paulson, 10 B. T. A. 732 (1928).
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Under this analysis one who makes a revocable gratuitous
assignment does not avoid the duty of paying the tax. There
is no a priori necessity for determining these cases one way
rather than the other. The assignee has the right to collect the
income so long as the assignment is unrevoked and can retain
whatever he has collected in this way.23 On the other hand, the
assignor retains a power of revocation until the assignee has
enforced his right and has, therefore, a power of disposition
over the income at the time when the right to receive it accrues.
In'view of this reserved power in the assignor it may be more
expedient to tax the assignor when the assignment is revocable.
A similar situation arises when there has been no assignment
but the taxpayer has entered into a contract containing a pro-
vision that part of the profits shall be paid directly to a third
party. Since by the better view a donee-beneficiary gets an
irrevocable right immediately,24 he would seem to be in exactly
the same position as one holding an irrevocable assignment. In
the single case in which this problem arose before the Board of
Tax Appeals 25 it was decided that the promisee must pay the
tax on the income paid to the beneficiary. This decision seems
unsound. If, however, the promisee had merely directed the
debtor to make the payments to the beneficiary, reserving the
power to revoke these directions, the decision would be unobjec-
tionable.2 6
There would seem to be no adequate reasons of policy for
deciding that one who makes an irrevocable assignment of his
right to receive income before that right accrues should never-
theless be chargeable for that sum as income when it has been
collected by his assignee. The arguments generally advanced
are that the government will be deprived of income unless very
stringent rules are applied 27 and that such assignments enable
some individuals to avoid paying their just share of the taxes.
The second objection seems to beg the question by assuming that
the assignor should properly pay a tax upon sums so assigned.
With regard to the first objection, Congress can levy the income
tax in any way it sees fit and can, if it so desires, expressly
provide that the assignor shall be taxed in all these cases. It is
believed that the more important policy involved is that of hay-
23 CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 20, at § 158 (2).
24 Ibid. § 142.
25 Samuel V. Woods, 5 B. T. A. 413 (1926); cf. Blalock v. Georgia Ry. &
Electric Co.; Rensselaer & S. R. R. v. Irwin, both supra note 17.
26 KLEIN, op. cit. supra note 18, at 318. In the Woods case, supra note
25, there were two contracts, one reserving the power of revocation and the
other not reserving it. It was held that neither was sufficient to transfer
the duty of paying the tax. Klein apparently treats the case as if the
power of revocation were reserved in both contracts.
27 See (1928) 41 HARv. L. REV. 675 for an expression of this point of view.
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ing a fairly certain basis for decision as to when the assignor
should be taxed and when the assignee. It is submitted that this
advantage is attained under the rule suggested-that the as-
signor must pay the tax unless he has made an irrevocable
assignment of the right to receive the income. 28
MARRIAGE ON THE HIGH SEAS
In the recent case of Fisher v. Fisher1 the New York Court of
Appeals was confronted with the problem of determining what
law governs the validity of a marriage on the high seas. The
issue arose in an action of judicial separation against the defend-
ant husband. The wife alleged that the parties "were duly
married on the 24th day of October 1925." The defendant denied
this allegation. It appeared that on this day the purported mar-
riage ceremony had been performed by the captain of the
Leviathan while the steamer was forty miles out from New York
bound for Southhampton, England. Cohabitation followed the
ceremony. The steamer was registered in New York. Title to
it, however, was in the United States Shipping Board, which is
domiciled in the District of Columbia.
Prior to this high seas ceremony the defendant had been
divorced from his former wife on the ground of adultery. Under
such circumstances a New York statute 2 prohibits remarriage
during the lifetime of the former wife. It is well settled that
this statute is binding only in New York and has no extra-terri-
torial effect.3 Since the former wife was still living the question
was raised as to whether the laws of New York followed the
Leviathan on the high seas and thus invalidated the marriage.
The Court of Appeals in affirming the decision of the Appellate
Division - held the marriage valid. The court said that since
a federal statute r provided that "Every vessel making voyages
from a port in the United States to any foreign port" should
2 It should be noted that none of the cases which have reached the courts
are inconsistent with the analysis herein suggested. The conflicts and in-
consistencies which are found are all in the Board of Tax Appeals reports
and in the decisions of the Commission and other quasi-judicial officers.
1250 N. Y. 313, 165 N. E. 460 (1929).
2 DoMEsTic RELATIONS LAw (1923) § 8.
3 Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18 (1881); Moore v. Hegeman, 92
N. Y. 521 (1883).
4 Fisher v. Fisher, 223 App. Div. 19, 227 N. Y. Supp. 345 (lst Dep't
1928). There were two questions before the court in the Appellate Division:
(1) were the parties legally married; (2) was the plaintiff cntitled to a
judgment of separation and an award for separate maintenance under the
statutory provisions? (N. Y. C. P. A. § 1161) The first question was the
only one before the Court of Appeals. For a discussion of the case in the
Supreme Court see New York Times, Feb.-2, 1927, at 9.
517 STAT. 275 (1872), 46 U. S. C. § 201 (1926).
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have an official log book, and that every master of such vessel
should make entry therein of "every marriage taking place on
board, with names and ages of the parties," it must be assumed
that marriages could take place on board the ship. The question
then was: what law controlled? The court saw three possibili-
ties: (1) the law common to all nations; (2) the law of the state
of the ship's registry; and (3) the law of the domicile of the
owner. The court held that the New York law did not follow
the Leviathan on its journey, but that there is a law upon the
high seas common to all nations which upholds the validity of
consensual marriages between competent parties; and that if the
federal statute could not be so interpreted, the marriage was
nevertheless valid because the law which applies to marriages
on the high seas is the law of the domicile of the owner of the
vessel, and not the law of the state where it is registered. In
the absence of proof of the law in the District of Columbia, it
was presumed that the common-law of that jurisdiction sanc-
tioned the marriage.,
Marriages on the high seas recently received considerable pub-
licity 7 as a result of an advisory opinion 8 of Mr. Parker, counsel
for the United States Shipping Board. This opinion adopted
the view, which the instant case rejected, that the law of the
port of the ship's registry controls. This is in accord with the
rule expressed by the American Law Institute Restatement, that
the law of the place of registry governs all acts done on board
the ship on the high seas: 10 claims for an injury committed on
6 The validity of common-law marriage in the District of Columbia
today is doubtful. KOEGEL, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE (1922) 152, 162, 164;
MAY, MARRIAGE LAWS AND DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1929) 95;
cf. 3 HoWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904) 175, 176.
7 (1926) 30 LAW NOTES 103, 152; 90 LITERARY DIGEST, Sept. 25, 1926, at
31; (1926) 162 LAW TIMES 102; (1926) 70 SOL. J. 826.
8 New York Times, July 18, 1926, at 12. According to this opinion the
masters of merchant vessels have no authority to conduct marriage cere-
monies unless they are so authorized or licensed by the state in which the
vessel is registered; but if a state does not specifically authorize marriages
to be performed by sea captains, the marriage may be valid if that state
recognizes common-law marriages. It has been suggested that the rule
laid down in the first part of this statement is the common-law rule of the
United States and England. See (1926) 162 LAW TIMES 102.
9 New York does not specifically authorize marriages to be performed
by sea captains; but it does recognize common-law marriages. Ziegler v.
Cassidy's Sons, 220 N. Y. 98, 115 N. E. 471 (1917)'; MAY, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 297; New York Times, July 18, 1926, at 12. Since most American
steamers are registered in New York, most marriages complying with the
common-law marriage requirements would be held valid if Mr. Parker's
opinion is followed. As far as European countries are concerned it is
quite probable that their courts would look to the United States law as a
whole and that they would find our "common-law" to be that consensual
marriages are valid.
10 "The jurisdiction of a state extends over a vessel flying its flag on
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board the vessel; " the navigation of the vessel; 12 collisions on
the high seas; 23 and marriages performed on the vessel. 14 This
rule has the advantage of being uniform, definite, and compara-
tively easy of application. 5 But the mere fact that a vessel
happens to be registered in a particular state does not necessitate
the application of the law of that state for all purposes while it
is on the high seas. The problems arising from the navigation
of a vessel cannot be said to involve the same considerations as
those incident to marriage on the high seas. The Restatement
generalizations would seem to be too inclusive.
It is doubtful, moreover, whether the Restatement view is
supported by the existing authorities. As to injuries committed
on board the vessel probably more cases apply the law of the
domicile of the owner than the law of the state of the ship's
registry. 1 The law of the domicile of the owner has also been
the high seas and its law regulates all acts done thereon.... Rights
acquired on a vessel on the high seas are acquired under the law of the
flag." CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 1926) §§ 40, 46
(b). International Law recognizes that a ship on the high seas for certain
purposes remains under the jurisdiction of the flag; but it does not recog-
nize this "floating island" theory for all purposes. 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIoNAL LAW (4th ed. 1928) 491; 1 MOORE, INTENIATON1L LW DxGFST
(1906) 930; Cf. VAMINGER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF As IF (1924) 33. For
a recent application of the theory for purposes of criminal jurisdiction
see The Case of the S. S. "Lotus," Permanent Court of International
Justice (1927) Series A, No. 10, Judgment No. 9; Brierly, The Lotu'
Case (1928) 44 L. Q. REV. 154; Comment (1928) 37 YLE L. J. 484. The
myth of the "floating island" would probably be applied in the case of
marriages on board a man of war. 2 MoORE, op. cit. supra at 491, 492.
11 CoNFLICT OF LAWS RESTATEMENT, SUpra note 10, § 443.
12Ibid. § 446.
3 "A claim for an injury caused by collision between two vasls on the
high seas is governed by the law of the flag of the vessel injured, or of
the vessel on which the person or thing injured is carried at the time of
the injury." Ibid § 444.
24"A marriage on board a private vessel is valid only if the law of the
flag is complied with." CONFLICT OF LAWS RESTATE51ENT, supra note 10,
§ 133. The "law of the flag" in the United States is defined as the law
of the state in which the vessel is registered. Ibid. § 40 (a); cf. GOOD-
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 255.
5 But it should be noticed that, when the marriage takes place on a
foreign vessel, the problem of determining what is "the law of the flag"
arises. DiCEY, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed. 1922) 669. If the "flag" is
English, the consensual marriage would probably be invalid. White, Mar-
ifages at Sea (1901) 17 L. Q. REv. 283; Charteris, Marriages on the High
Seas (1908) 19 JURmICAL REv. 178; Wilkinson, Marriages at Sea (1916)
28 ibid. 253. The laws of France and Russia make specific provision for
marriages on the high seas. Laws 1893, 9 June; CoDE CrVz (Carpenter,
1927) § 144; 93 DUVERGIER, CoLLECTioN DES Lois (1893) 209; 1 MARIAGE
LAws OF SovIEr RussIA (1921) c. 1, n. 2; 2 ibid. §§ 53, 54.
16 International Navigation Co. v. Lindstrom, 123 Fed. 475 (C. C. A.
2d, 1903); Bjostad v. Pacific Steamship Co., 244 Fed. 634 (N. D. Cal.
1917). Contra: Fisher v. Boutelle Trans. and Towing Co., 162 Fed. 994
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applied to determine the taxable situs of a vessel.17 The case of
Bolmer v. Edsall'18 seems to be the only American case besides
Fisher v. Fisher 19 which considers the possibility that the law
of the port of registry might govern the validity of marriages
upon the high seas. This case involved an ex parte suit by the
husband against the wife for the annulment of their marriage.
The marriage ceremony had been performed by the ship's sur-
geon on board the steam ship Algonquin, between the ports of
La Romana and Marcoris, in San Domingo. It did not appear
where the vessel was owned, registered, or whose flag she flew;
nor was it shown whether the marriage took place within terri-
torial waters o on the high seas. The court presumed, in the
absence of evidence of the ship's ownership and registry, that
the marriage was governed by the law of the forum. At the
first hearing the court said: "Assuming that the steamship
Algonquin was an American vessel, it would seem from the
admiralty laV that the validity of the marriage . ..would
depend upon the law of the state of the union in which the
vessel was registered or where it was owned. . . ." In the
court's supplemental memorandum it appeared that the ship
was owned and registered in this country. The court in grant-
ing the annulment upheld the marriage but was not specific as
to whether the law of the domicile of the owner or that of the
port of registry applied to the marriage on board the ship."0
Another theory as to marriages on the high seas is that since
(E. D. Pa. 1908) (law of port of registry); see Magruder and Grout,
Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
395, 416. In the following cases the law of the domicile of the owner was
held to apply, but it did not appear where the vessel was registered.
Southern Pacific Co. v. DeValleda Costa, 190 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 5th, 1911);
Sonden v. Fore River Shipbuilding Co., 223 Mass. 509, 112 N. E. 82 (1916).
There are several cases in which the state of registry coincided with the
domicile of the owner. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546 (1879); U. S.
Shipping Board v. Greenwald, 16 F. (2d) 948 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927). As to
foreign law governing collisions on the high seas, see LORENZEN, CASES ON
THE CONFLIrT OF LAWS (1924) 282 n.
I7 Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 Sup. Ct. 13 (1911);
cf. The Havana, 64 Fed. 496 (C. C. A. 2d, 1894). One of the first cases
cited as supporting the law of the port of registry was Crapo v. Kelley,
16 Wall. 610 (U. S. 1872) ; but in this case the state of registry and the
domicile of the owner were the same.
Is 90 N. J. Eq. 299, 106 Atl. 646 (1919); cf. Hynes v. McDermott, 91
N. Y. 451 (1883) (where it was said that, in th3 absence of any evidence,
it could not be presumed that a vessel plying the English channel, on
which a citizen 'of New York contracted a marriage, was under a flag
which would subject the marriage to a law different from that of New
York).19 Supra note 1.
20 The fact that the court cited International Nav. Co. v. Lindstrom,
supra note 16, and said in referring to it that: "A steamship owned by a
corporation of New Jersey is a vessel of that state and subject to its laws,
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the sea is res communis it is subject only to international law.21
It has been said that according to the law of all Christendom
consensual marriages between competent parties are valid2
And long standing customs acquiesced in by the nations are
sufficient to establish a rule of international law.23 It might
thus be argued that by international law the marriage on board
the Leviathan was valid.2 4
The "no law" theory may also be offered as a solution of the
problem. This theory postulates the open sea as a place without
law. Starting with this assumption several conclusions may be
reached. If we take Bishop's view that marriage is a "natural
right" of man, of which the law cannot deprive him, the fact
that there is no law sanctioning the marriage cannot prevent its
taking place according to the parties' own forms.,2  This view,
however, is not supported by any case and seems to be too
ingeniously metaphysical. On the other hand it may be argued
that since there is no law governing the marriage on the high
seas it must be controlled by the le. domicilii of the parties.
This view was adopted in Normzi v,. Nor~nzn. 0  In this case the
parties went upon the high seas to evade the California law.
The captain of the schooner performed the marriage ceremony
while they were outside the three mile limit. On the same day
and immediately after the ceremony the parties returned to Los
Angeles county. They lived together as man and wife. The
wife subsequently left her husband, who thereupon brought an
action to have the marriage declared valid and binding. The
court held that the law of the domicile of the parties, i.e., Cali-
fornia, governed the marriage on the high seas; and that by that
law the marriage was invalid. The difficulty with this approach
arises when the parties have different domiciles. And a similar
difficulty arises, when the law of the domicile of the ship's
owner is considered as controlling, if the vessel is owned by
several owners domiciled in different states, or if successive
sales take place while the vessel is on the high seas.
notwithstanding its registry in New York," w-ould lead one to believe, in
spite of several other ambiguous statements, that the law of the domicile
of the owner was controlling.
21 As has been pointed out, supra note 10, the courts give only partial
recognition to the "floating island" theory.
22 See Hutchins v. Kimmel, 31 Mich. 126, 132 (1875).
23 The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 667, 20 Sup. Ct. 290 (1900).
24 Cf. Loring v. Thorndike, 5 Allen 257 (Mass. 1862); and dictum of
Lord Stowell in Reading v. Smith, 4 Eng. Ecc. 551, 560 (1821).
25 1 BisHoP, MARRIGE AND DIVORCE (5th ed. 1873) § 351. It is also
generally recognized, in theory, that parties marooned on an island, where
"no law" applies, could marry according to their own forms.
26 121 Cal. 620, 54 Pac. 143 (1898); Note (1898) 12 HARv. L. REv. 273"
Note (1898) 60 AMi. ST. REP. 947; BEALE, CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws
(2d ed. 1928) 581.
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In its larger aspects the Fisher case 27 involves an equilibration
of two conflicting policies: that which prohibits remarriage after
divorce, and that which seeks to uphold marriage wherever pos-
sible.28 The New York legislature has expressed its policy on
the first point by statute; 2 and the Uniform Marriage Evasion
Act - has gone to the logical extreme in fostering this policy.
But is not the policy of upholding a marriage stronger than this
prohibition on remarriage? To declare a marriage invalid may
mean the bastardization of children, the defeating of rights of
inheritance, subjection to criminal prosecution or a disturbance
of many of the other legal relations which surround the marriage
status.31 The courts are reluctant to upset these relations; and
perhaps this is one reason for the maxim semper presumitur pro
matrimoni .3 2  In the Fisher case 33 the parties thought they
27 Supra note 1.
28 Cf. GOODRICH, op.'cit. supra note 14, at 261.
29 Supra note 2; cf. (1929) 42 HARV. L. REv. 701; GOODRICH, op. Cit. supra
note 14, at 259.
30 "If any person residing in and continuing to reside in this state who is
disabled or prohibited from contracting marriage under the laws of this
state shall go into another state or country and there contract a marriage
prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state, such marriage shall
be null and void for all purposes in this state, with the same effect as
though the particular marriage had been entered into in this state." UNI-
FORM MARRIAGE EVASION ACT § 1; cf. ibid. § 2; TERRY, UNIFtM STATE LAWS
(1920) 404. The Act has been adopted in five states: Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Vermont and Wisconsin. RICHMOND AND HALL, MARRIAGE
AND THE STATE (1929) 194; cf. FLUGEL, THE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC STUDY OF
THE FAMILY (1926) 101.
3 1 See Hyde v. Hyde, 1 Prob. and Div. 130 (1866); CONFLICT OF LAWS
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 126; JENKS, A BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW
(1929) 278. That the state also has an interest in the marriage relation-
ship is obvious; ib may exercise this interest by fixing degrees of con-
sanguinity and affinity, by establishing a minimum marriage age, etc.
RICHMOND AND HALL, supra note 30, at 335.
32 See In re Lando's Estate, 112 Minn. 257, 266, 127 N. W. 1125, 1128
(1910). In addition to not wishing to disturb the web of legal relations
which surround the marital relationship the courts probably have another
reason for sustaining a marriage wherever possible: they inarticulately
postulate marriage as a desirable state. Recent investigations would lead
us to believe that the courts are correct in their observations, at least with
respect to death, crime, and insanity. GROVES AND OGBURN, AMERICAN
MARRIAGE AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (1928) 126, 137, 141. And under
the pressure of changing conditions and the advance of industrialism
marriage as an institution seems to be disintegrating. MOWRR, FAMILY
DISORGANIZATION (1927) 146, 149; GOODSELL, PROBLEMlS OF THE FAMILY
(1928) 302. This may be a further reason for the courts sanctioning
marriage; and it has been suggested that a marriage should be good if It
is valid "according to any law which may reasonably be invoked as appli-
cable-lex loci, len domicilii, lex civitatis ligeantiae, perhaps len fori." Baty,
Capacity and Form of Marriage (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 444, 456.
33 Supra note 1.
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were married; they lived together as man and wife for several
years; and their friends and associates assumed that they were
validly married. Under such circumstances it seems probable
that the Court of Appeals decided to resolve the conflicting poli-
cies in favor of upholding the marriage, and then learnedly
marshalled the existing theories sanctioning marriage on the
high seas.
It is obvious that the rule alternatively laid down in the
instant case, that marriage on the high seas is governed by the
law of the domicile of the owner of the vessel, will not always
result in upholding consensual marriages. If the predominant
factor in the court's mind was the desire to resolve doubtful
questions in favor of the validity of such marriages, and the
next case to arise is one where the law of the domicile of the
owner does not recognize consensual marriages, the court may
find it desirable to limit the holding of the principal case and
apply the law said to be "common to all nations." - 1
SETTLOR'S RETENTION OF CONTROL AS DEFEATING THE RIGHT OF THE
BENEFICIARIES TO TAKE AFTER HIS DEATH
The common practice for people to entrust the management of
their property and the disposition of it after their deaths to
trust companies has often brought into question the validity of
the provisions for disposition after death. Does the law allow
the property to go to the beneficiaries named, or does it invali-
date the transaction and give it to the estate of the settlor? This
question will be here considered in regard to the common situa-
tion where the property turned over to the trustee is personalty.,
In the simplest case, where legal title passes to the trustee, and
no interest remains in the settlor except the right to the income
for his life, little objection has been raised to the right of the
beneficiaries to take after the death of the settlor,2 the courts
treating the beneficiaries as acquiring thereby the interests of
34 Supra note 24; cf. Baty, loc. cit. supra note 32.
1 Since there are a number of considerations which make the problem
more complicated where land is involved, no attempt will be made to dis-
cuss the situation arising when the trust is one of realty. One readily calls
to mind such considerations as the statute of frauds and the other formali-
ties required for the validity of deeds of land, the possibility of future
estates in realty as against their restricted use in cases of personalty, and
the rules of construction peculiarly applicable to deeds of realty. A study
of the cases impresses one at once with the fact that conveyances of land
to a trustee under the conditions herein discussed are viewed from a quite
different standpoint than conveyances of personalty. Furthermore, the
problem generally arises today in eases where only personalty is involved.
The turning over of land to a trust company to manage and invest is not
a common practice.2 See cases cited infra note 6.
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cestuis, which became absolute on the death of the settlor. But
few settlors are content to rid themselves of all control over the
property except the right to the income from it for life. With
the retention of further control arise two objections. The settlor
may have transferred what would appear to be the legal title to
the trustee,3 but nevertheless may have retained so great an in-
terest that the court will treat the gift over to the beneficiaries,
after the settlor's death, as a testamentary disposition, and con-
sequently invalid if not made in accordance with the statute of
wills. Or the settlor may retain such a degree of control that
the court will look upon the trustee as his agent or bailee, both
of which relations are revoked by the death of the principal or
bailor. Under either view, the beneficiaries lose, and at the
death of the settlor the property goes to his estate.4
From a practical standpoint, there is no real difference be-
tween the two objections. If the amount of control that is re-
served during the life of the settlor is such as to establish an
agency or bailment relation, the only effect of the trust is to pass
the title at the settlor's death. This makes the gift over void as
a testamentary disposition, unless there is a compliance with the
statutes of wills. Courts speak sometimes the direct language of
testamentary disposition, and sometimes the indirect language of
agency or bailment, but apply, obviously, the same considerations
3 The person to whom the property is turned over by the legal owner
thereof cannot, of course, be a trustee for the beneficiaries unless he is given
the legal title to the property. Hence, if the legal title is transferred to
the beneficiaries, the person holding the property cannot be trustee for
them. Thus, in Noble v. Leanard, 153 Cal. 245, 94 Pac. 1047 (1908), where
-certificates of stock were delivered to a person to pay the dividends to the
donor for his life, and then to turn them over to certain beneficiaries, and
the certificates were assigned to these beneficiaries, it was held that the
-person to whom the stock was delivered could not be trustee for the bena-
ficiaries, and that the beneficiaries could not take since the disposal was
testamentary. Similar facts, except that the dividends were payable to the
'beneficiaries, have been held to constitute a valid gift. In re Lindhorst's
Estate, 216 Mo. App. 473, 270 S. W. 150 (1925).
The passing of legal title is here used to mean that the donor has made
the delivery or performed the other formalities necessary to convey the
legal title to the person who is to manage the property. In all of the
cases cited in subsequent notes this was true. There are a few cases in
which the reservation of a power of control, despite a manual tradition or
formal assignment, has been held to defeat the requirement of delivery
necessary to pass title to the trustee, through its implication of an intent
that title shall not pass. See Brown v. Crafts, 98 Me. 40, 56 Atl. 213 (1903) ;
Shea v. Crofut, '203 App. Div. 210, 196 N. Y. Supp. 850 (2d Dep't 1922);
cf. McGillivray v. First National Bank, 56 N. D. 152, 217 N. W. 150 (1927).
4 Attention should here be called to the fact that the courts attach little
significance to the words used by the parties. If a court feels that the effect
of the transaction was to establish an agency, or to make a testamentary
disposition, it will ignore the fact that the parties called the transaction a
"trust," or the person holding the property a "trustee." Or if it feels that
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in determining the fundamental problem of whether the bene-
ficiaries or the estate will take. Realizing that the basis of these
two objections is the same, we shall treat both cases as analogous
in facing the question of how much control the settlor may re-
tain, after having gone through the formalities of conveying
legal title, without defeating the rights of the beneficiaries to
take after his death.5
The first steps are well defined. As has been pointed out, if
the settlor retains nothing but the income for his life, a valid
trust is created, and the property goes to the beneficiaries.6 This
is so regardless of the quantum of the income to be paid, whether
it be the entire income from the property, T or only a fixed amount
a year,8 or even if it be a sum sufficient to support the settlor for
his life, though this requires part of the principal as well as the
income, the discretion as to what sum is necessary being left with
the trustee.9 And the trust is almost universally held to be valid,
so as to enable the beneficiaries to take, where the settlor retains
the transaction created a trust, the use of the terms "agent" or "attorney"
wl be disregarded. Cf. Warsco v. Oshkosh Say. & Trust Co., 183 Wis. 156,
196 N. W. 829 (1924); Mersereau v. Bennet, 124 App. Div. 413, 10S N. Y.
Supp. 868 (1st Dep't 1908). In deciding the problems involved in the situa-
tion herein discussed, the courts face the issues squarely and are not be-
fuddled by terminology.
No attempt has here been made to consider the cases where the prop-
erty is a bank deposit, and the trustee is the bank. In that situation there
is a relation of a contractual nature between the bank and its depositor
which makes the problem quite different from the one discussed here. Nor
is this discussion concerned with the rights of the beneficiaries with respect
to any party other than the estate of the settlor. The rights of creditors,
or of the state under the inheritance tax statutes present different consid-
erations that cannot be discussed herein. In regard to the latter problem,
see Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 657.
6 Robertson v. Robertson, 147 Ala. 311, 40 So. 104 (1906) ; Miles v. Miles,
78 Kan. 882, 96 Pac. 481 (1908); Hall v. Hall, 109 Va. 117, 63 S. E. 420
(1909); Smith v. Wold, 125 Minn. 190, 145 N. W. 1067 (1914); Brown v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915). Likewise, where the
income is to be paid half to the grantor and half to the trustee. Roberts
v. Taylor, 300 Fed. 257 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924). Or where two-thirds to
grantor, and one-third to another person. McHenry v. McHenry, 152 Ga.
105, 108 S. E. 522 (1921).
7S eases cited supra note 6.
8 Haulman v. Haulman, 164 Iowa 471, 145 N. W. 930 (1914) (four per
cent on the principal to be paid annually) ; ef. Mersereau v. Bennet, upra
note 4 ($12 a week to settlor, same amount apiece to two other persons).
9 Lyle v. Burke, 40 Mich. 499 (1879); Sands v. Old Colony Trust Co.,
195 Mass. 575, 81 N. E. 300 (1907); Harrod v. McComas, 78 Kan. 407, 96
Pac. 484 (1908); ef. Gilman v. McArdle, 99 N. Y. 451, 2 N. E. 464 (1835)
(support of settlor and her husband, and the survivor of them, residue to
go for masses; husband allowed to take income after the death of the
settlor). In thd latter case, the court treated the transaction as a con-
tract, but said that a valid trust probably e.xisted.
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the power to revoke, modify, or change the provisions of the
trust.o %
But once we pass beyond these lines, and give the settlor more
elements of control than these, the validity of the trust, from
the beneficiaries' standpoint, is not so certain. Elements of con-
trol that have been held insufficient to invalidate a trust are the
retention of possession of the property 11 (where such retention
does not defeat the passing of title to the trustee) and the re-
tention of the power to direct the investments 12 or reinvest-
ments 13 to be made. And in several cases courts have held a
trust to be valid, so as to allow the beneficiaries to take in prefer-
ence to the estate, even though the settlor reserved the right to
draw from the trustee such sums as he should desire during his
lifetime,1 or such sums as he should deem necessary for his com-
fort and support.15 A power to change the beneficiaries has been
10 Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858); Lines v. Lines, 142
Pa. 149, 21 Atl. 809 (1891); Brown v. Spohr, 180 N. Y. 201, 73 N. E. 14
(1904); Wilcox v. Hubbell, 197 Mich. 21, 163 N. W. 497 (1917); Jones v.
Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309, 146 N. E. 716 (1925); Nat'l Newark
& Essex Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq. 74, 128 Atl. 586 (1925) ; Roche
v. Brickley, 254 Mass. 584, 150 N. E. 866 (1926). An agreement by the
trustee to reconvey on demand is similar to a power of revocation, and does
not defeat the validity of the trust. Rosenburg v. Rosenburg, 40 Hun 91
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1886).
In Worthington's Adm'r v. Redkey, 86 Ohio St. 128, 99 N. E. 211 (1912)
the reservation of a power of revocation was considered to be a strong ele-
inent in negativing an intent to pass title. This case cannot be said
to hold squarely that the reservation of a power of revocation will invall-
,date a trust of this type, but it comes the nearest to such a holding of any
American decision.
"iKelley v. Snow, 185 Mass. 288, 70 N. E. 89 (1904) (power to change
the dispositions also reserved); Spangler v. Vermillion, 80 W. Va. 75, 92
S. E. 449 (1917). The fact that the trustee allows the settler to retake
possession from him does not defeat the trust. Williams v. Evans, 154 Ill.
98, 39 N. E. 698 (1895) ; Talbot v. Talbot, 32 R. I. 72, 78 Atl. 535 (1911).
12 Forney v. Remey, 77 Iowa 549, 42 N. W. 439 (1889) (absence of a
:power of revocation noted by the court). Same where direction that no
investments be made in other than legal securities without consent of
;ettlor. Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Atl. 634 (1914)
(power to revoke also reserved).
13 In re Soulard's Estate, 141 Mo. 642, 43 S. W. 617 (1897); Talbot v.
Talbot, sdupra note 11.
14 Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590 (1878) (power treated similarly to the
power of revocation); Hellman v. McWilliams, 70 Cal. 449, 11 Pac. 659
(1886) (retention of power held to indicate intention of retaining a life
estate only) ; Wade v. Button, 72 Vt. 136, 47 Atl. 406 (1900) (beneficiaries,
according to directions of settlor, to take only such property as settlor did
"not live to use up"); cf. Rosenburg v. Rosenburg, supra note 10.
is Lovett v. Farnham, 169 Mass. 1, 47 N. E. 246 (1897). In West v.
White's Estate, 56 Mich. 126, 22 N. W. 217 (1885), the trial court in-
structed the jury that the question of whether or not a trust was estab-
lished, where the settlor was to be paid such sums as she should need to
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held by one court not to invalidate a trust, though the transac-
tion resembled an insurance policy more than it did a trust."
On the other hand, the trust has been held invalid, and the
estate allowed to take, in cases where the elements of control
retained were not much greater, if as great, as some of those just
stated. A retention by the settlor of the right to be paid such
sums as she should demand during her life, coupled with a power
of revocation, has been held to make the dispositions after the
settlor's death invalid as testamentary. 7 And where the trustee
agreed to turn back the property on demand, it was held that an
agency or bailment had been created. 8 Where the trustee was
to hold the property subject to the "control and demands" of the
settlor during his lifetime, the disposition to be made on his
death has been declared to be testamentary. 0 The same view
was taken where the settler was allowed to draw out whatever
money he desired during his lifetime.20 In another case, the
trustee was held to be a mere agent of the settlor, where the lat-
ter retained the power to direct the trustee to pay to him or to a
third party such sums as he should desire, together with the
power to appoint a new trustee.21 A like view has been taken
live comfortably, depended on whether the settlor intended to create an
agency or a trust. The jury returned a verdict for the beneficiaries. The
instruction was upheld on appeal.
Cf. Pirie v. LeSaulnier, 161 Wis. 503, 154 N. W. 993 (1915). Here the
settlor assigned the legal title to a note to the beneficiary and made her
own agent the agent for the beneficiary. The agent paid the income to the
settlor, collected the note when due, and invested the proceeds in a bond in
the name of the beneficiary, all by direction of the settlor, and without the
knowledge of the beneficiary. The court held that title passed to the bene-
ficiary on the assignment, and that the beneficiary took on the settlor's
death.
16 Siter v. Hall, 220 Ky. 43, 294 S. W. 767 (1927).
17 McEvoy v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 201 Blass. 50, 87 N. E. 465
(1909). This decision has been regarded as the leading case on the rezer-
vation of control sufficient to defeat the trust. It is difficult to reconcile it
with Davis v. Ney, supra note 14, and Lovett v. Farnham, -upra note 15.
Stevenson v. Earl, 65 N. J. Eq. 721, 55 Atl. 1091 (1903) is often cited as
being in accord with the McEvoy case. However, it really represents a
different situation, for the railroad in the ease was in the same position as
a bank holding a deposit as trustee. See supra note 5.
is Russell v. Webster, 213 Mass. 491, 100 N. E. 637 (1913).
19 Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 214 S. W. 791 (1919). The transfer to the
trustee was also held to be invalidated because of fraud on the part of the
trustee and beneficiaries in inducing it to be made.
2 0 Demartini v. Allegretti, 146 Cal. 214, 79 Pac. 871 (1905). The trustee
admitted that the purpose of the transaction was to evade the necessity of
probate proceedings. The opinion gives no light as to how much this fact
influenced the court. In the McEvoy case, smpra note 16, the same situa-
tion existed, the trustee testifying that the settlor "told him that she in-
tended the instrument in place of any will she might leave.' That decision
also gives no indication as to the effect this had on the court.21 Warsco v. Oshkosh Say. & Trust Co., supra note 4; cf. Darling v.
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where the settlor'retained possession of the corporate stock
which formed the r'es of the purported trust, and voted it.22 The
fact that the settlor was to be paid such money as she needed
to live on, together with the statement in the creating instrument
that the property was held in trust for the settlor influenced one
court in holding the disposition after death testamentary.23
Another court held the reservation of a power of revocation
coupled with the use of the phrase "my trustee" and similar ex-
pressions by the settlor to be sufficient to show an intent that the
purported trustee be merely the agent of the settlor.24
The problem has come up again in the recent case of Union
Trust Co. v. Hawkins.25  There the settlor retained the power to
control the investments and the power to revoke the trust, and
also agreed to pay all the taxes on the res. The Court of Appeals
Mattoon State Bank, 189 Wis. 117, 207 N. W. 254 (1926) (person directed
bank to pay certificate of deposit to beneficiaries after death, but reserved
full control over it; Warsco case followed, and beneficiaries not allowed
to take).
22 Witthoft v. Comm. Development & Inv. Co., 268 Pac. 31' (Idaho 1928);
of. Comer v. Comer, 120 Ill. 420, 428, 11 N. E. 848, 851 (1887) (settlor de-
posited bonds with trustee to pay interest to his wife for her life, then the
bonds to go to his heirs; settlor notified trustee that he (the settlor) was
"to control the bonds" during his life; this was said not to create a trust).
23 Smith v. Ferguson, 90 Ind. 229 (1883).
24 Worthington's Adm'r v. Redkey, supra note 10. This case may not fall
exactly into the class herein discussed, for it is not clear that the trustee
was to pay the income to the settlor for life. In other respects it is in
point. Cf. Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 88 N. E. 1005 (1909). In this case
personalty was turned over to an attorney to hold, and to give to certain
persons on the donor's death. The donor tore off interest coupons for the
next few installments due on the bonds and collected them. She died before
further interest was due. It was held that the attorney was the agent of
the donor, and the administrator was allowed to take. Cf. Egerton v. Carr,
94 N. C. 648 (1886).
With the cases cited in notes 17 through 24, supra, of. Morrison v. Bart-
lett 148 Ky. 833, 147 S. W. 761 (1912), where an assignment of a note,
which provided that the grantee should have no right to deal with it during
the grantor's life, was admitted to probate as a will. See also Pritchett's
Estate, 9 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 600 (1891), where an instrument conveying both
realty and personalty to another to hold, as attorney, for the purpose of
paying over the income to the grantor to the extent necessary to support
him for his life, and then to distribute among certain beneficiaries, was like-
wise admitted to probate.
25,161 N. E. 548 (Ohio App. 1927). The case was appealid to the Su-
preme Court of Ohio, and a decision was handed down on May 31, 1928,
affirming the Court of Appeals decision. Since then a rehearing has been
granted, which is now pending. In the opinion (which has not yet been
reported) handed down on May 31, 1928, the court held that the instrument
was testamentary, and that the beneficiaries could not take since it was
not properly executed as a will. The court severely condemns the use of




of Ohio held that the purported trustee, a trust company, was
merely the agent of the settlor, and that the provision for pay-
ment to beneficiaries after the death of the settlor was invalid
as an attempted testamentary disposition.P
Few generalizations may be drawn from a survey of these
cases. If the settlor who has reserved the income for life re-
serves also a power of revocation, and no more, the beneficiaries
named by him will probably take the property on his death. But
if he goes further and retains other elements of control, uncer-
tainty enters in as to the validity of the provisions made for the
beneficiaries. The fact that most of the cases denying validity
because of the retention of further elements of control are recent
ones seems to indicate that the problem has only lately become
acute.
To a layman it might seem foolish that a settlor could reserve
a power of revocation without defeating the dispositions after
death, but could not reserve certain other elements of control,
for nothing appears to be greater than the power of revocation.
The answer is that the courts have reached their conclusions on
the basis of certain doctrines of property law. The law has
never considered a power of appointment as an interest in land
in the usual sense of that term, and to this day recognizes that
one man may be the "owner" of property even though another
has a power of appointment in regard to it. So, too, the reserva-
tion in a settlor of a power to revoke the trust, even though he
himself is a beneficiary for life, is not considered as inconsistent
with the creation of a presently vested interest in the other bene-
ficiaries. And when we find the courts upholding the reserva-
tion of certain other elements of control, their opinions in most
cases base it on the ground that the particular situation is anal-
ogous to the reservation of the power of revocation.
26 It is, obviously, impossible to reconcile all of the cases where the diz-
position has been defeated with those where it has been upheld. However,
there appear to be no inconsistencies in the decisions in any particular
jurisdiction, except perhaps massachusetts, where it is very difficult to
reconcile the McEvoy case with certain others, as is pointed out smpra
note 17.
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